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Abstract
Richard Rorty believes that philosophy in the West is the result
of a conflict between religion and science. In fact, philosophy
seeks to clarify the border between religion and science, so
neither of them would be able to overstep its explanatory or
predictive potentialities. He remarks that we do not have such
a thing as philosophy in the East. This paper intends to ask
two questions: what is the nature of the comparable conflict in
an Eastern country, Iran, and what are its effects on aesthetic
studies? I will draw on the idea of the conflict between
theology and mysticism. The main difference between these
two sides is the methods each uses to achieve the truth:
literal and symbolic interpretation. This conflict happens inside
religion and not between religion and science. Consequently,
all aspects of society would assemble under the influence of a
single paradigm, religion, that dominates all other aspects,
including philosophy and science and their practitioners.
Nevertheless, with the introduction of modern science and
philosophy, and also the historical exhaustion of mysticism,
there is a new type of conflict. Now, religion finds itself jointly
in conflict with both modern philosophy and science. What is at
the center of this conflict is aesthetics.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
Believing both in a benevolent creator and in the results of
modern science might seem to be intellectually irresponsible to
some well-educated people who study philosophical texts of
the past one hundred years or so. In fact, neither religion nor
science has the ability to fully explain or predict the world we
live in. Richard Rorty, in a lecture on “The Compatibility of
Religion and Science,” examines the ideas of James and
Dewey on “intellectual irresponsibility.”[1] It seems quite
justifiable for a philosopher like Rorty to talk about the
compatibility of religion and science because through
examining this relationship he can get closer to a better
definition of the border between these systems in a democratic
society. Consequently, neither of them can make promises he
is snot able to fulfill.
Rorty briefly clarifies the boundaries of science and religion
and the times they may overstep these boundaries. In fact,
science and religion are competing paradigms for explaining
the world. He asserts, “Although there are alternative
descriptions of things, descriptions useful for different
purposes; none of these get close to the way things really
are.” He finds such a description at the heart of the functional
description in the pragmatism of James and Dewey. From a
pragmatic viewpoint, we may not find any description of things
thoroughly detachable from our needs. Rorty finds Nietzsche,
Heidegger and Derrida supporting a conception of truth that is
against the correspondence theory of truth that regards truth
independent of our needs. For the sake of argument, he
believes that there is no definite way to test the
correspondence between our conception of reality and the way
things are actually in themselves.
Rorty’s lecture mainly centers on the rejection of the idea put
forth by some scholars who consider religious people as
intellectually irresponsible. He claims that there are some
people who do not feel any tension when they are asked to
present a justification for their life while their life seems to be
smooth and happy. Therefore, philosophy or philosophical
reading and thinking are not an urgent need for everybody,
and we cannot condemn such people for not taking
intellectuality as seriously as some others do.
As we know, there are different approaches to the relationship
between science and religion, from complete convergence to
absolute divergence.[2],[3] The proponents of each side
seemed to be more inflammatory earlier, for example in the
seventeenth century, and more peaceful recently, in the
postmodern era. Now scholars talk about a constructive
approach or integrative approach or they try to find ways that
religious and scientific discourse can add to each other.[4],[5]
For example, McGhee Orme-Johnson asserts, “Bruno Latour
offers an argument for what constitutes the purposes of
religion and science, and argues that because of these
purposes religion and science do not have a connection.
Stephen Jay Gould says that while religion and science are
inseparable, there is no convergence between the two. I have
suggested ways to understand their arguments and still allow
for a converging connection between religion and science.”[6]
The contradiction between scientific and religious ideas, as
Rorty claims, might not be necessary to  resolve. These ideas
are two different ways of explaining the world; however, one
may seem to be crude and simplified, that is,  religion, and the
other refined and precise.
For Rorty, since the beginning of modern science, religious
beliefs and scientific beliefs serve different purposes, the
former  to predict and control things in space and time and the
latter to give our life a kind of purpose. Religion may overstep
its boundaries by trying to have a predictive function and
science may overstep when it tries to convince us not to
believe in God.
At the end of his lecture, Rorty draws some conclusions that
perhaps could add more weight to the purpose of this paper.
Rorty believes that philosophy had a mediating function
between science and religion in the Western culture. There has
been a conflict between religion and science since the
Renaissance, and philosophy was responsible for resolving this
conflict. He says, “We developed this thing called philosophy
as an academic specialty precisely because we are in a
civilization with a conflict between science and religion and we
invented this third discipline to be the mediator.” He claims
that in Eastern civilizations there has not been such a conflict
between religion and science, so we don’t have a discipline
called philosophy.
As far as this idea is related to my home country, Iran, I can
agree with Rorty that there was not such a conflict in Persian
culture between religion and science. Most scientists or
thinkers were primarily religious, and we did not nearly have
any major secular scientist or someone like Galileo.
Here in this paper I would like to ask two questions. First, I
would like to find out if, as Rorty believes, there was not such
a conflict between religion and science in Iran, then what kind
of possible conflict did we have instead? Secondly, how has
this conflict  affected aesthetics and related studies?
2. The conflict
Regarding the first question, a brief historical look at Iran’s
philosophy is helpful. Iran’s history is conventionally divided
into two eras, before the Muslim conquest of Iran (651) and
after that. The most prominent philosopher of the first era was
Zarathustra, who is mainly considered a prophet rather than a
philosopher. However, in the second era, Avicenna was the
most significant Islamic philosopher.
Mostly, Islamic philosophy was the result of the first
translations of Aristotelian philosophy. Early Islamic philosophy
starts with two independent lines. The first line was al-Kindi
(801-873), Rhazes (854-925) and their followers, who were
closer to Neo-Platonism, and the second line was the
Aristotelians of Baghdad, like al-Farabi (872-951). These two
lines merged in the philosophical and scientific investigations
of Avicenna (980-1037). He was the first philosopher whose
philosophical writings had internal consistency, a system of
independent parts based on the syllogistic logic of Aristotle. His
philosophy marked the end of ancient and the beginning of
scholastic philosophy. Avicenna’s thoughts were dominant in
Islamic philosophy afterwards.[7]
Among Islamic philosophers, we may find a very few who had
some nonconventional ideas, like al-Razi. “There were even
thinkers who seem to have been influenced by Greek
skepticism, which they turned largely against religion, and Ibn
ar-Rawandi and Muhammad ibn Zakariyya’ al-Razi presented a
thoroughgoing critique of many of the leading supernatural
ideas of Islam.”[8] Their critique was partial, and they always
remained devoted to the religion but asked a few different
questions. For example, al-Razi asked, “If God is the creator of
the world, why hadn’t he created the world before he created
the world?”
We may say that the dominance of Avicenna on Islamic
philosophy is comparable with Descartes’ influence in the
West. Descartes, contemporary with Galileo, was more of a
scientist than a philosopher. He intended to reach a kind of
certainty in philosophy that we could find in mathematics.
Avicenna, on the other hand, was a religious person who
intended to justify Islamic theology with rational philosophy.
He tried to prove the existence of the soul and God with some
strong logical reasons. Both Avicenna and Descartes proved
the existence of God, mainly under the influence of Aristotelian
metaphysics. But the difference I would like to stress is the
most essential and inherent one in their approaches to
philosophy. The difference is in the point of intellectual
departure, the stand each of them takes to start his
philosophizing. The one who only believes in God and not
much in religion starts with doubt, and the one with faith to
God and religion, Avicenna, starts with a kind of confidence
that can usually be found in religious people.[9]
For Avicenna, there seems to be a kind of confidence that is
derived from his belief or faith in God, a benevolent creator or,
as he philosophically described it, as a “necessary existent” in
comparison with human existence, which is contingent. We
may claim that such a faith, or strong dependence or devotion,
is not rooted in philosophical investigations, for certain, as
Aristotle himself believed in the “necessary source of
movement who is unmoved; everlasting being engaged in
never-ending contemplation.” Aristotle’s version of God seems
to be more acceptable for a philosopher or even a scientist in
Western thought.
But Avicenna had made himself exceptionally familiar with
Aristotle; he was also a very competent scientist and, at the
same time, a very devoted Muslim. We can clearly see that
while he is rather meticulous about propositions in his exegesis
on Aristotle’s metaphysics, he is rather easy-going concerning
religious ideas and dependence on metaphysical realms. We
might be inclined to ask if Avicenna was intellectually
irresponsible? This question sounds quite ridiculous, at least to
those who are familiar with his philosophical and scientific
texts. So we may think that there are two possible
suppositions here. The first one is that a religious person,
aside from his philosophical knowledge and investigations,
would at least have some unreasonable and unjustifiable
thoughts. The second supposition is that religion gives us a
kind of certainty and devotion we cannot find either in
philosophy or science, since Avicenna was both a competent
scientist and a fervent philosopher.
I would go with the second supposition, as I think Rorty
would. It seems that religion has a prominent feature that
always comes first, that is, a religious person always
suppresses other intellectual investigations and occupations in
favor of a religious set of ideas, and it appears that we cannot
call it an intellectual irresponsibility since we can see the same
approach both in ordinary people and in some philosophers
(and scientists).
This feature of religion, the suppression of conflicting ideas,
gives rise to a kind of conflict. In the Western tradition,
religion is in conflict with an exterior realm of science, and
philosophy works as a mediator between the two sides. But it
seems that in the Eastern tradition, the conflict happens inside
the realm of religion; there is an intrinsic conflict between two
different interpretations of religion, namely theology and
mysticism. The first believes in the literal exoteric
interpretation of religious propositions, and the latter in the
symbolic esoteric interpretation of those propositions.
This conflict is partially different from what Bertolacci finds. He
believes that, “Outside the narrower scope of philosophy and
its history, it is interesting to note how the introduction of a
foreign pagan discipline, like metaphysics, into a monotheistic
social context, like the Islamic one, determines either the
accordance or the antagonism between philosophical theology
and revealed theology, or, in other words, between the
quintessence of Falsafa, on the one hand, and the speculation
of Kalām, on the other. The study of the ways in which this
confrontation took place in the Islamic culture of the Middle
Ages may shed light on the contemporary debate on the
relationship between reason and faith and contribute to the
promotion of dialogue among different cultures.”[10]
Here Bertolacci understands the conflict between reason and
faith, in other words, between a field that tries to reasonably
justify religious propositions (Kalām) and a field that tries to
practice reason and logic apart from religious preconceptions
(philosophy). Both fields are Islamic; however, they both
include a great deal of faith and reason and we can also find
mystic inclinations in both groups. So it seems that the
difference here between philosophical theology and revealed
theology, as Bertolacci understands it, is categorical and
linguistic. The conflict between faith and reason is more of a
Western conflict than an Islamic one.
Therefore, the conflict in Persian culture is, as this paper
claims, a methodological difference between mysticism and
theology. While the former sets up a spiritual odyssey to find
the truth, the latter uses logic to reach it. Both theologians
and philosophers may have mystic attitudes and may even
shift from theology to mysticism.[11] Despite this, the
difference between them remains as one of the most
prevailing cultural features, that there are some people who
care about the surface side of religion and those who intend to
find the core meaning.
Classic Persian literature comprehensively elaborates on the
conflict between these two sides.  Those who are religious try
to act as closely as possible to theological findings, and those
who believe religion is only a way to achieve a higher personal
truth, the truth that all existents are just One (the idea of
Unity of Existence). We may claim that this conflict is the main
theme of classical Persian literature.
The nature of this conflict is quite different from the one we
find in Western culture. This conflict is not between two
competing paradigms, but is within a single, suppressing
system that emphasizes purity, faith, and acceptance of truth
on both sides. The result is the integration of all aspects of
life, including political, social, personal, and scientific realms.
Consequently, the tolerance of different ideas and perspectives
is difficult or nearly impossible and would lead to accusations
of heresy.
With the introduction of Western or modern perspectives in
philosophy and science, a competing paradigm arises.
Mysticism, which was an old and difficult practice that was
exhausted over time by the struggle against the suppressing
and overwhelming power of theology, gave its place to newer
and stronger realms, that is, modern philosophy and
science.[12]
Therefore, in the modern period we came to the same conflict
as in the West but with a considerable difference. Traditionally
in Iran, philosophy and science were part of a bigger paradigm
of religion, and distinguishing between the two did not seem
practical. Presently, postmodern interpretations and dialogues
can be used by the religious paradigm to widen its dominance,
and to present pluralistic and pragmatic interpretations of its
existence with the interest of keeping its dominance. Thus,
from one side, religion emphasizes its dominance through
conventional means like theology and a weakened, controlled
version of mysticism, and from the other side, it uses the
potentialities of newer interpretations of science and
philosophy while being fully aware of their inefficiencies to
empower its dominance. Here stands aesthetics: a
representative of paradigms of modern science and
philosophy.
3. Aesthetics and mysticism
Aesthetics is the field that brings up the nature of the conflict
discussed above. Since in Islamic teachings making pictures
and statues is unwelcome, academics who intend to study
aesthetics have to find the roots of aesthetics in mysticism, in
which there exists various discussions of beauty. The kind of
beauty we can find in mysticism, however, is an ontological
one that is the result of the creation of God. Conventionally, it
is said that God was a hidden treasure that wanted to be
known. As a result, He created the world to be understood and
appreciated. So the job of humans is the appreciation of that
beauty. This appreciation is the same as falling in love with
God. So beauty and love are at the beginning of the creation
of the world. Hafez says:
When beamed Thy beauty on creation’s morn,
The world was set on fire by love new-born.
Thy cheek shone bright, yet angels’ hearts were
cold:
Then flashed it fire, and turned to dam’s mould
The lamp of Reason from this flame had burned,
But lightening jealousy the world o’erturned[13]
Aesthetics in Islamic philosophy is important, since “Many of
the problems of religion versus philosophy arose in the area of
aesthetics.”[14] The reason aesthetics is more problematic for
Islamic philosophy is that it is a new and subjective field of
study. As we know, aesthetics found its present connotation in
the eighteenth century, with the definition of Baumgarten.
After the eighteenth century, aesthetics regarded fine art as
an independent field of philosophy. Before the introduction of
aesthetics to Islamic dialogues, Islamic philosophy was
occupied with poetry and saw it as a logical form. “One of the
interesting aspects of Islamic philosophy is that it treated
poetry as a logical form, albeit of a very low demonstrative
value, along the continuum of logical forms which lie behind all
our language and practices.”[15]
Recently, however, Islamic academics who intended to study
the aesthetic aspects of their cultural heritage needed to have
more than poetry, so they had to look for a broader
perspective to study. Islamic theology rejects the idea of
image-making or other kinds of art for different reasons.
Therefore, mysticism appeared to match the goals of the
academic field of aesthetics. Mysticism is the field in which
scholars can find long discussions about love, beauty, creation,
and truth. These terms are very similar to those we find in
modern Western aesthetics. Accordingly, mysticism is the field
that can be used for aesthetic studies. However, beauty in
Western aesthetics is related to humanity or nature but, in
Islamic mysticism, beauty is an ontological and holy idea. The
meaning of fine art, therefore, is not reachable in the realm of
Islamic aesthetics.
There are few books on Islamic Aesthetics dealing with the
conflict presented here. Gonzalez, in a book called, Beauty and
Islam, Aesthetics in Islamic Art and Architecture, attempts to
theorize a formulation showing the presence of aesthetic
thought and tradition in Islam. He uses the term “aesthetic
phenomenology” to show how Islamic art and beauty can be
justified. He asserts, “Aesthetics, and particularly aesthetic
phenomenology, forms a specific and new field, which is still
not taken into account in the realm of Islamic studies,
although it is fully integrated into contemporary analytical
works on art and art theory."[16] He finds the same conflict 
presented in this paper, the fact that phenomenology is a
Western philosophical tradition that sounds inappropriate for
Islamic cultural order. But he believes we shouldn’t jump to
the conclusion that aesthetics did not properly exist in Islam.
Instead, he refers to a book written by Vilchez that outlines
the history of aesthetics in classical Arabic thought. But
Gonzales himself confirms that this book, in spite of its name,
has a historical, sociological, and descriptive point of view, and
scholars should look for some aesthetic foundations. He states,
“Very few scholars take the initiative to use aesthetics as
theory and method in order to understand the
conceptualization and the forms of works of art.”[17]
Traditionally it is believed that “religious knowledge is
unquestionably the highest form of knowledge.”[18] Such a
presupposition leads to the idea of Islamic science, which
seems to be independent from Aristotelian methodology.
Islamic scholars also talk about shifting from Western human
sciences to an Islamic one, the need for reforming and
conceptualizing the human sciences from Islamic perspectives,
and the need for Islamic grounds for human sciences. What
actually happens, however, is some  historical investigations
that find diverse quotes from different Islamic figures and
texts about different issues without any integrative approach
or theory.
One example is interpreting Persian miniatures that seem
confusing. The confusion lies in the fact that most Persian
miniatures follow the same conventions, such as no tendency
to imitate nature, two dimensional flat scenes without
perspective, decorated background, extension of light all over
the scene, and unreal colors.  There are very few aesthetically
idiosyncratic paintings whose painter has put his or her
fingerprint on the work.
Persian painting was an inseparable part of book decoration, a
major art in Iran. A group of artists would  get together under
the supervision of a patron, usually a king or a member of
royal family, to design, write (calligraphy), bind, and decorate
a literary text. Painting was just one of the processes of
making this work of art. Little by little, these arts or skills
separated from each other until each stood on its own
traditions and the conventions that influence them to the
present day.
It seems that any study of Persian miniatures has to consider
that, first, Persian painting was an integrated part of making
beautiful books, it was not an independent art, and second,
while Persian painting slowly became independent, it was not
fully to the time of Qajar (1784-1925) and when it did become
independent, the specific rules of creating and interpreting this
art was never clearly discussed.[19]
The most popular theory for interpreting Persian painting is a
mystic theory that considers Persian paintings as
representation of the Other World. Nasr believes that the ‘non-
three-dimensional’ character of Persian miniature is “a
recapitulation of space of another world and concerns another
mode of consciousness.”[20] He views European perception of
perspective during the Renaissance as a kind of betrayal of
natural perspective. In this theory, all pictorial elements of
Persian paintings are the symbol of the “imaginal world” or
alam al-khial.
As a matter of fact, alam al-khial is a metanarrative that is
highly inclusive in the way that it can interpret any pictorial
element of Persian miniatures with a fixed, simplified
viewpoint. In this approach, we can simply interpret elements
like space, time, movement, color, and form as symbols of a
secret language referring to some metaphysical ideas.
However, this approach does not to have enough explanatory
potentiality to describe and interpret Persian painting.
Therefore we may say that, while Persian paintings represent
real figures, the underlying reasons and justifications have
remained unclear. These paintings have their roots in Chinese
paintings and old Iranian illustrations (Mani), that narrated
classical Persian stories under the influence of Islamic culture.
As different traditions have mixed together and evolved during
a long history, one cannot find any aesthetic theory underlying
Persian paintings.
4. Possible approaches to aesthetics in Iran
Two main options remain for an academic scholar of aesthetics
in Iran. The first and most popular approach is working on
different aspects of Islamic cultural heritage and imposing on
them Western aesthetic classifications and discussions to make
them capable of being the subject of scientific study. This
approach is mostly affected by historicism, and it
(un)intentionally strengthens the political power relations and
cultural conventions. Also, academic scholars who use this
approach will win most of the budgets allocated to universities,
and their research results enjoy greater attention. In this
approach, the incompatibility of method, approach, and the
subject of study is ignored, making the result semi-scientific.
For example, they study subjects such as mosques’ arabesque
and calligraphy with the principles of Western aesthetics in a
scientific way. However, the raison d’etre of these handcrafts
does not match any Western theoretical framework. Islam has
encouraged arabesque and calligraphy mainly because they do
not involve any pictures.
The main reason for their dominance in Islamic tradition is
first, ideological, and then, political, not by the free will of
artists. People who made them had not considered themselves
as independent subjects who create beautiful objects but were
thinking about making the mosque, or “house of God,” as
beautiful as possible based on the teachings and norms of the
tradition. Imposing any Western theoretical framework on
studying these handcrafts ignores the main reason for their
formation. Most importantly, they are pure forms without any
content and can only be interpreted symbolically.
The second approach is discussing and studying modern
Western aesthetics. The problem with this is that such
discussions mainly happened in the Western culture, and
adopting them to domestic perspectives and cultural situations
mostly results in superficial adaptations of the original
discussions. The outcome will, most probably, not be
acceptable either within the country or outside of the country
within the Western academic world. Aesthetics scholars with
such an approach will remain suspended between the two
incompatible worlds of West and East. Such academics will
remain marginal in comparison with the central world of
Western intellectual culture, and regarded as nonconventional
inside the country.
To summarize the condition, we may say that the tension of
the second group is mainly the result of the kind of conflict we
had between the Sufists and theologians. This historical
conflict resulted, as can be clearly seen from the political and
social situation of the society in the exhaustion of the Sufists’
perspective. This means that the literal interpretation of
religion managed to suppress the symbolic interpretation of it.
But with the introduction of modern science and philosophy,
religion has found new rivals.
In the meantime, philosophy has become rather secular,
linguistic, analytic, pragmatic, and pluralistic. In the past,
philosophy could help religion most when religion was in need
of logical justifications. But now philosophy remains far from
any hardline justifications and keeps its distance from both
religion and science. Philosophy still attempts to discuss
science and religion but does not try to justify them in any
way. So now, for religion in Eastern culture, both philosophy
and science are rivals and religion has to fight on two fronts,
modern philosophy and modern science.
And, oddly enough, we can clearly see that religion benefits
most from the critiques that both science and philosophy make
of themselves. Religion has the capability of using all the
improvements and influence of science or philosophy. Every
improvement can be regarded as getting closer to the truth
that religion claims, and every philosophical or scientific
assertion shows the absurdity and incapability of superficial
earthly human knowledge in comparison to spiritual
knowledge.
5. Conclusion
As we know, in the mid-eighteenth century the academic field
of aesthetics developed as a distinct area of philosophy.
Andrew Bowie truly asserts, “The often hyperbolic importance
attributed to art toward the end of the eighteenth century
evidently has its roots in the decline of theology and the
disintegration of theologically legitimated social orders.”[21]
Self-consciousness is an important feature that can be related
to the autonomy of aesthetics. Self-consciousness replaces the
reliance on God, and beauty replaces the idea of divinity. Such
modifications in Western intellectual culture led, in a corollary
fashion, to the academic field of aesthetics.
The conflict between religion and science, which was mediated
by philosophy, enhances these modifications. Some may find
these modifications as improvements and some may disagree.
However, this is a controversial question for Eastern academics
that sometimes reaches the level of obsession. The discussions
related to the definition of modernity and post-modernity are
seriously followed in Eastern intellectual cultures. Scholars are
eager to find whether these modifications were actual
improvements or not, or if they follow the same path.
Rorty’s formulation of the Western conflict might seem to be
an oversimplification of a larger and more sophisticated
problem. But all in all, it is helpful and enlightening. In an
Eastern Muslim country like Iran, theology won over Sufism.
The conflict was ongoing for about five centuries, since the
Safavid Empire. Sufism was suppressed by its rival, which had
more political and social power. As universities and academic
fields of science were introduced to the country, new rivals for
religion seemed to appear: philosophy and science.
Interestingly, all these rivals managed to coexist at the cost of
some modifications on all sides. Religion tried to look more
scientific, logical, and up-to-date, while philosophy tried to
look supportive of the basic ideas of religion, and science tried
to find justifications for religious habits and actions.
Any academic researcher in the field of aesthetics who intends
to carry out his or her research free from social, cultural, and
political norms or conventions will face a dilemma between
Western and Eastern perspectives that seem to be different
and even contradictory in their most basic approaches and
methodology. However, they may share the same
terminology. 
The first step in solving any aporia is formulating the problem.
The conflict between theology and mysticism, as seen here, is
the first step to moving forward. In religious contexts, the
problem is typically formulated based on metaphysical beliefs
and ideas, and this sometimes leads to more confusion and
misunderstanding of the problem. This paper was a struggle to
provide the basis for further dependable formulations of this
aporia.[22]  
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